rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control
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rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control

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Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Corporate governance -- Econometric models.,
  • Stock ownership -- Econometric models.,
  • Stockholders" voting -- Econometric models.,
  • Corporate governance -- United States -- Econometric models.,
  • Stock ownership -- United States -- Econometric models.,
  • Stockholders" voting -- United States -- Econometric models.

Book details:

Edition Notes

Other titlesCorporate ownership and control
StatementLucian Arye Bebchuk
SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper no. 7203, Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 7203.
ContributionsNational Bureau of Economic Research.
Classifications
LC ClassificationsHB1 .W654 no. 7203
The Physical Object
Pagination37, 3, 4 p. ;
Number of Pages37
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL22394953M

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Get this from a library! A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control. [Lucian A Bebchuk; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- Abstract: This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure - and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. Downloadable! This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure - and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper analyzes the decision of a company's initial owner whether to maintain a lock on control when the company goes public. This decision is shown to be very much influenced by the size. This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure--and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper analyzes the decision of a company's initial owner whether to maintain a lock on control when the company goes by: This paper de velops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure – and in particular, of the choice between dispersed and concentrated ownership of corporate shares and votes. The proposed theory shows how the size of private benefits of control influences the choice of ownership structure.

T his paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure - and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper analyzes the decision of a company’s initial owner whether to maintain a lock on control when the company goes public. This paper develops a rent-protection theory of corporate ownership structure – and in particular, of the choice between concentrated and dispersed ownership of corporate shares and votes. The paper analyzes the decision of a company’s initial owner whether to maintain a lock on control when the company goes public. Abstract. According to corporate financial theory, the states of financial distress, default, and bankruptcy present a fundamental stage in the life-cycle of corporations that provokes substantial changes in the ownership of firms’ residual claims and the allocation of rights to manage corporate resources [e.g. (), ()].However, empirical results on how precisely these changes evolve have. Takeover Bids vs. Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control (with Oliver Hart) Harvard Olin Discussion Paper No. , October NBER Working Paper No A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control NBER Working Paper No. ().

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers , National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Kim, Se-Jik, "Bailout and conglomeration," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages , February. Alexander Aganin & Paolo Volpin, A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control. A rent-protection theory of corporate ownership and control. corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book. CORPORATE CONTROL IN EUROPE. and legal form on corporate ownership and control. Black () and Roe () L. A Rent-Protection Theory of . These results are consistent with the predictions of the theory concerning the effects of investor protection and entrepreneurial cash‐flow ownership on firm valuation. 11 11 In an effort to tell a more precise story, we have included both the antidirector rights score and the legal origin in the regression (both become insignificant), added Cited by: